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Abstract: Constitutional pluralism is a theory for the post-sovereign European state. This state-type 
can only be made sense of historically, emerging out of postwar European reconstruction through the 
repression of popular sovereignty and restraining of democracy associated with various forms of de-
politicisation, including the project of European integration. It starts to become unsettled at Maastricht, 
just as Neil MacCormick lays the ground for its theoretical development with his Lecture, ‘Beyond the 
Sovereign State’. This unsettling evolves from a series of irritants into a full-blown crisis in the recent 
decade, with sovereignty claims returning both from the bottom-up and the top-down, to the extent 
that we can legitimately ask whether we are now moving ‘beyond the post-sovereign state’? This is all 
missed in a constitutional pluralist literature that evades material issues of democracy and political 
economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutional pluralism is a theory, or set of theories, for the post-sovereign European 
state and state-sytem. Its basic theoretical move is twofold. First, the concept of 
sovereignty – understood as ultimate political authority – is folded into constitutional 
authority, into the constitution itself and thereby into its authoritative interpreters, 
particularly, if not exclusively, constitutional courts. Second, constitutional authority is 
then presented as quasi-federal or compound in nature, a feature of a multi-layered 
constitutional system comprising the domestic constitution and a European constitution 
(and their respective authoritative interpreters). 
In the article that launched a thousand more, Neil MacCormick was quite explicit 
about his own ‘post-sovereign’ agenda.1 Based on the 1992 Chorley Lecture, in the heat of 
the Maastricht debates, the article, entitled ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, begins by 
outlining the ‘widespread view’ that sovereignty is ‘mightily important’, and then offers a 
contrasting perspective; that the era of the sovereign state is over: 
 
A different view would be that sovereignty and sovereign states, and the inexorable 
linkage of law with sovereignty and the state, have been but the passing phenomena 
of a few centuries, that their passing is by no means regrettable, and that current 
developments in Europe exhibit the possibility of going beyond all that. On this view, 
our passing beyond the sovereign state is to be considered a good thing, an entirely 
welcome development in the history of legal and political ideas. This will be the view 
stated in the present lecture.2  
 
MacCormick’s goal, as he later put it, was to defend the ‘coexistence of two entities’, ‘the 
states of Europe, now not-fully-sovereign states, and the European Union, still a non-
sovereign Union’.3 But what begins as aspirational and normative, is, by the end of the 
Lecture, presented as a fait accompli. He concludes, emphatically, that ‘beyond the sovereign 
state is where we are now’.4 
That, of course, was a quarter of a century ago. Precisely where we are in the current 
moment is questionable. But we are not, or no longer, beyond the sovereign state. We 
may, however, be beyond the post-sovereign state. Or so it will be argued. 
The argument in brief is that MacCormick erred in his diagnosis, basing it on a 
reductive view of sovereignty in line with his legal positivism. But he was wrong in a 
revealing way. A ‘post-sovereign ideal-type’ did emerge out of postwar reconstruction, 
paradigmatically in West Germany. Sovereignty, however, was not transcended as the label 
might suggest; it was folded in, or repressed.5 This is a complex phenomenon, comprising 
not only formal, institutional developments – domestically and transnationally – aimed at 
                                                     
1 N MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56:1 Modern Law Review 1.  
2 Ibid at 1. 
3 MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP, 2002) 142. 
4 Note 1, above at 18. 
5 See M Wilkinson, ‘The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe: Liberal Excesses, Democratic Deficiencies’ in M 
Dowdle and M Wilkinson (eds.) Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (CUP, 2017) 38. 
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constraining democracy, but also informal socio-economic, political and even cultural 
changes relating to ideas about the limits of self-government and democratic control over 
the economy.  
Postwar reconstruction provides the conditions for a deracinated constitutionalism,  
disconnected from popular sovereignty. These are propitious conditions for the 
development of European constitutionalism and the constitutional pluralism that followed 
in its wake.6 But the post-sovereign dynamic reaches a turning point in the Maastricht era. 
Just as MacCormick identifies it, the ground for constitutional pluralism becomes 
increasingly unstable: functional and systemic differentiation between the domestic and 
EU constitution becomes harder to sustain, German reunification places the question of 
popular sovereignty squarely back on the table, the German Constitutional Court steps up 
its own quest for constitutional sovereignty vis-à-vis the ECJ, the democratic deficit of the 
EU becomes more acute, and with the rise of various Eurosceptic political movements, 
nationalism starts to reassert itself as a political and social phenomenon. As the post-
sovereign state increasingly resembles a post-democratic state, the permissive consensus 
on European integration comes to an end. 
What begins at Maastricht as a set of mere irritants grows through the Euro-crisis 
phase into a full-blown crisis of post-sovereignty and of constitutional pluralism. 
Sovereignty claims now re-emerge both ‘from below’, in regard to the so-called ‘populist’ 
surge in the nation-state (in the core of Europe as well as in the periphery) and ‘from 
above’, in regard to a European Union that is increasingly exercising emergency politics of 
its own, in response to the various crises. The recent Brexit referendum potentially 
represents the moment of rupture from the postwar project of post-sovereignty, although 
it is too early to say where it will lead.  
Due to inequalities within the European Union among the Member States, the present 
conjuncture is asymmetric. The EU comes to resemble a hegemonic federation, in which 
there is both material and ideological domination: in the Euro area especially, one country 
or bloc of countries increasingly exercises de facto sovereignty over others.7 The crisis of post-
sovereignty does not therefore necessarily signal the return of classical state sovereignty 
(either domestically or upscaled to the EU); the idea of sovereignty is highly distorted, 
severed from any credible connection with democracy and sovereign equality. This is all 
missed in constitutional theory that fails to attend to questions of political economy and 
state transformation.  
The paper proceeds in five steps. First, it argues that constitutional pluralism, as it 
emerges out of the work of Neil MacCormick, represents the pluralization of ultimate legal 
authority through the repression of political sovereignty. Although a consequence of 
narrow (positivist) methodological premises, this cannot be straightforwardly dismissed, 
because, as argued in a second stage, the repression is a real and significant feature of the 
postwar constitutional settlement. It will be argued, third, that post-sovereignty becomes 
unsettled at Maastricht as sovereignty claims start to return and that it appears increasingly 
                                                     
6 The repression of the concept of sovereignty in fact suggests the EU is in that respect a classic federation, a 
third type besides the loose confederation of sovereign states and the federal state. See e.g. O Beaud, Theorie de la 
Federation (Presses Universitaires de France, 2009). 
7 See e.g. U Beck, German Europe (Polity Press, 2013).  
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untenable during the Euro-crisis phase as existential challenges mount, albeit without any 
conclusive rupture. In a fourth step, the paper returns to MacCormick, to examine why all 
of this is evaded in much of the constitutional pluralist literature. I will conclude with a 
final irony: the survival of constitutional plurality in Europe may now require the 
reclaiming of sovereignty by reclaiming the idea of ultimate democratic political authority.  
 
 
 
II. QUESTIONING QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: EXPOSING THE 
TWOFOLD THEORETICAL MOVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
 
The repression of sovereignty in the constitutional pluralist imagination is reflected in two 
complementary moves: first the concept of sovereignty is folded into constitutional 
authority and often into legality – constitutionalism – and second, it is systematised through 
the co-existence of two or more sets of juridical claims to ultimate legal authority – 
constitutional pluralism.8 Although conceptually the first, constitutionalist move, is prior, the 
second is more explicit in the literature, and so it makes sense to begin there.  
 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
 
Within the context of European integration, where it is most often articulated, 
constitutional pluralism amounts to the claim that there are two sets of final interpretative 
jurisdictions, domestic and European, without any ultimate arbiter: 
 
It is for the European Court of Justice to interpret in the last resort and in a finally 
authoritative way the norms of Community law. But equally, it must be for the highest 
constitutional tribunal of each Member State to interpret its constitutional and other 
norms, and hence to interpret the interaction of the validity of EC law with higher 
level norms of validity in the given state system. Interpretative competence-
competence is a feature of the highest tribunal of any normative system.9 
 
In the early stages of integration, with two legal orders functionally and systemically 
differentiated, the presumption was that the authority of each could co-exist without 
friction. But once the ECJ had presented its own legal order as effectively constitutional 
in form, through the doctrines of direct effect and primacy, the potential for conflict 
emerged, as evidenced most famously in Internationale Handelsgesselschaft and the Solange 
                                                     
8 For a recent restatement see N Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisted’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal 333. 
Amongst constitutional pluralists Walker’s account is more cautious about claims to have overcome sovereignty 
and more insistent on presenting constitutional pluralism as a matter of political as much as legal theory. Walker’s 
term ‘late sovereignty’ rather than ‘post-sovereignty’ illustrates this more nuanced view on the enduring legacy of 
the concept, see ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 
2003).  
9 N MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) European Law Journal at 264 
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jurisprudence, on the question of the highest guardian of fundamental rights. But rather 
than spill into open conflict it resulted in an uneasy truce between the ECJ and the 
Bundesverfassungsgerricht.10  
The normative value of constitutional pluralism is cashed out in this contest. Each 
system should retain its authority, leaving any conflict in a state of irresolution and thereby 
avoiding monism and the hierarchy of either the domestic court or the ECJ. Instead of 
insisting on the ultimate legal authority of one or the other (or a third party), constitutional 
pluralists argue for a recognition of two ‘equally legally valid’ claims. Pluralism and 
heterarchy can be maintained by holding open the question of ultimate Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, avoiding ‘outright collision’ through mutual deference and accommodation 
between courts.11 
MacCormick insists that pluralism does not imply an absence of order between the 
two sets of legal systems.12 It is, however, premised on absence of sovereignty,13 which, 
like virginity, is ‘lost without another’s gaining it’, as he memorably put it.14 This 
methodological move recalls Hans Kelsen’s attempt to overcome the question of 
sovereignty by insisting on an exclusively juristic concept of the state. But MacCormick 
takes a different route than Kelsen and evades even the concept of the state as a symbolic 
representation of legal unity, substituting it for the notion of a ‘Commonwealth’. Since 
law, for MacCormick, is institutional normative order, it does not depend on a 
transcendental basic norm, but a ‘working constitution’, a ‘kind of shared custom or 
convention held amongst those who treat the constitution as foundational of normative 
order’. Looking at the practice of legal officials in both Member States and the EU, he 
concludes that legal superiority will depend upon which perspective one takes, which 
‘internal point of view’, in Hart’s conceptual vernacular.15 Pluralism thus refers to the 
plurality of perspectives one might adopt with regard to the ultimate rule of recognition in 
the European Commonwealth.  
 
 
 
B. CONSTITUTIONALISM  
                                                     
10 Cf. B-O Bryde, The ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – A Milestone in Transnational 
Constitutionalism’ in M. P. Maduro and L. M. Azoulai (eds.) The Past and Future of EU Law (Hart Publishing, 
2010).  
11 MacCormick, above note 10.  
12 The idea of pluralism under international law is, he concludes, ‘contextually more persuasive and appropriate’ 
(Questioning Sovereignty, above, at 121). Although if the discretion of national courts is qualified by their 
international obligations, there is little specification of precisely what those entail (see e.g. Questioning Sovereignty, 
above at 117).  
13 See e.g. Questioning Sovereignty, above, at 10. 
14 Note 1 above, at 16. Repeated less assertively in Questioning Sovereignty, above at 126. In the final iteration, 
eschewing any form of radical pluralism, MacCormick suggests that conflicts between domestic and EU law 
should ultimately be determined, in Kelsenian fashion, by norms of international law. 
15 Questioning Sovereignty, above, at 94 – 95. Since, according the internal view of UK officials sovereignty remains 
with the UK constitution, but according to EC officials it lies with the Treaties, MacCormick argues that the theorist 
seeking a disinterested perspective ‘can entertain both or several views cognitively, suspending any question of 
volitional commitment to one or another. Instead of committing oneself to a monocular vision dictated by 
sovereignty theory, one can embrace the possibility of acknowledging differences of perspective, differences of 
points of view’, note 1 above, at 6. 
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MacCormick was equivocal on what lay behind the positive law, qua norm, institution or 
convention. He hinted that not all interpretative conflicts could be resolved judicially, that 
not ‘every legal problem has a legal solution’.16 But he also proclaimed a belief that Hart’s 
positivism ‘can supply the account that is needed to make credible an approach to 
sovereignty as a predominantly legal concept’.17 And throughout Questioning Sovereignty, 
MacCormick effectively endorses the legalistic and characteristically German positivist 
equation of sovereignty with the issue of supreme judicial interpretative authority, the 
question of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz.18  
It is by working with a legal rather than political conception of sovereignty that 
constitutional pluralism is able to emerge. Underneath the legal topsoil, this move is 
determined by Hart’s critique of Austin’s command theory, the stepping stone into Hart’s 
own concept of law. As is well known, Hart rejected Austin’s account because he thought 
its focus on command neglected a significant type of rule – power-conferring rules – and 
the modality of rule-based behaviour – the internal aspect of rules which distinguishes 
them from mere habits of obedience.19  
MacCormick, like Hart, rejected Austin’s conception of law as command based on 
habitual obedience to a political superior. But this focus gets in the way of tackling Austin’s 
concept of sovereignty, which is entirely reductive, neglecting the process through which 
political power is generated and acquires legitimacy. MacCormick, like Hart, flips the issue 
over, targeting official legal practice and adherence to a conventional rule – a ‘rule of 
recognition’ – as foundational of a legal system. The focus on legality displaces the 
question of legitimacy.  
As a consequence of cleaving so close to Hartian jurisprudence, MacCormick offers 
only a threadbare account of how political power and authority is constituted in the 
context of European integration. With Austin’s conception of law as the target, 
MacCormick remains implicitly tied to the same reductive conception of political power.20  
In the Chorley Lecture itself, MacCormick’s concern with pursuing this 
jurisprudential project gets in the way of any robust constitutional analysis of the EU as a 
legal-political entity. This is apparent from his suggestion – even if to be dismissed - that 
the fact of habitual obedience of the UK to Europe, with the threat of sanction for any 
unilateral exit, might imply that Europe is ultimately politically sovereign. MacCormick 
rejects this not because it is a flawed conception of political sovereignty, but because he 
prefers Hart’s legal conception which, he thinks, can do without the concept of sovereignty 
altogether, based instead on the acceptance – the internal point of view – of legal officials 
of a rule of recognition. Pluralism is thereby a suitable way to capture the apparent reality 
of radically different legal viewpoints, of the domestic official and the European official.   
                                                     
16 Questioning Sovereignty, above, at 119. 
17 Italics added. 
18 ibid.  
19 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961).  
20 This, essentially, is Martin Loughlin’s challenge, to which MacCormick struggles to respond. See N 
MacCormick, ‘Questioning Post-Sovereignty’ (2004) 29 European Law Review 852.  
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The absence of any robust analysis of the relational aspect of legal-political authority 
is not merely an error of constitutional theory, however; it has practical repercussions. 
With regard to European integration it leads, for example, to an implausible normativism: 
MacCormick’s stated belief that ‘the relationships of the various parts [of the EU] will 
depend in the long run’ not on various constellations of political power and legitimate 
authority but ‘on a still-to-be-elaborated principle of subsidiarity.’21 The absence of a 
relational analysis also flattens out the relative authority of the Member State on the one 
hand, and the EU on the other. Presenting their claims as ‘equally legally valid’ ignores 
fundamental material asymmetries between the two sets of entities in terms of power and 
authority, or legality and legitimacy: in regard to the two key functions of the modern state 
- to determine warfare and welfare - there is simply no comparison between the Member 
States and the EU.22  
Later pluralists took a different approach to MacCormick, not in offering a more 
robust conception of the political, but in offering a more expansive account of legality.23 
This opens up a path to an explicitly cosmopolitan route and a substitution of sovereignty 
for public reason as a standard for assessing institutional arrangements and outcomes in 
any multilevel system.24 Other constitutional pluralists had, by then, begun to take a 
different tack too, offering distinct, non-legal registers to resolve conflicting authority 
claims: e.g. an ethics of constitutional tolerance, moral principle, dialogical consensus, 
institutional harmony, contra-punctual law.25 In each case, the search was for some 
normative order above the conflicting systems. Order depended on the ability to identify and 
in so doing generate a kind of universal ratio – constitutional tolerance, principles of 
legality, or subsidiarity. This was a period of tremendous constitutional optimism, at least 
in the academy, it should be recalled, constitutionalism set to ‘rule the world’, as one 
collection suggested, based on the authority of its universalist values.26 As for sovereignty, 
‘[t]he real lawyerly task is to neutralise this question’, according to one commentator.27  
As some astute observers have noted, this manner of reconciliation appeals to if not 
collapses into a different form of monism.28 It appeals to an answer that lies outside the 
                                                     
21 Questioning Sovereignty, above, at 95. 
22 See M Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Pluralism: An Oxymoron?’ (2014) Global Constitutionalism 9.  
23 Matthias Kumm moves beyond the positive law by situating constitutional pluralism in the domain of morality, 
suggesting ‘applicable reasons of a general practical nature that are determinative for deciding the issue [of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz] one way or another’, see Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict’ (2005) 11:3 European 
Law Journal 262.  
24 M Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism In 
and Beyond the State’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law and 
Global Governance (CUP, 2012) 268-270. Following MacCormick, albeit less excusably given the rise in sovereignty 
claims in the intervening years, he also proposes that ‘in the law of the European Union, the language of subsidiarity 
has completely replaced the language of sovereignty’ at 293 (italics added). Extraordinary that subsidiarity continued to 
exert hold of the constitutional pluralist imagination dispute the fact that its juristic career was an almost 
complete failure. 
25 M Avbelj and J Komarek identify six versions, in their ‘Introduction’ to Constitutional Pluralism in and Beyond the 
European Union (Hart Publishing, 2012) 4 – 7.  
26 See note 24 above.  
27 See A Jakab, European Constitutional Language (CUP, 2016): ‘our task is to avoid or prevent the question, and if 
someone still poses it, then we should give a “solution” that does not say anything practical for conflicts’ (at 116). 
He goes on to suggest that the language of Staatslehre is ‘redundant’.  
28 See e.g. A Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in Avbelj and Komarek (eds.) above.  
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realm of the plurality of positive constitutional law but inside the legal-moral universe, to 
be given by Herculean constitutional scholars or judges. In some versions, proportionality 
becomes a meta-principle, offered from within the juridical discourse as a means to weigh 
or balance competing constitutional claims.29 But in the absence of any scientific scale to 
measure these values, which may well conflict with one another, we are left with a set of - 
relatively constrained – decisions, no less political simply because of their juridical dressing. 
If we ask what the figure of Hercules - whose decisions always represent the “true” 
meaning of the law - represents, do we have a better answer than “the sovereign”?30  
 
 
 
III. THE POST-SOVEREIGN STATE: FACT OR FICTION? 
 
Does all this mean that MacCormick’s ‘post-sovereign’ agenda is simply a juristic 
fiction or ideology that can be casually dismissed? The answer is both ‘yes and no’. It is 
fiction in the straightforward sense that no legal system is self-executing, no constitution 
freestanding from the material order that undergirds it. 31 To the extent jurists think they 
can transcend or neutralize sovereignty they are merely offering a new fiction, an ideology 
in the critical sense of the term, meaning an idea belonging to a particular social group but 
which purports to universality. But the ideology is not freestanding: post-sovereignty 
corresponds to real constitutional phenomena; it is a significant feature of the 
constitutional imaginary of postwar Europe. Popular sovereignty is repressed through the 
subsumption of constituent power into constitutional texts and judicial interpreters. 
Sovereignty is not transcended or neutralised but it is transformed, as evidenced by the 
explicit language adopted by some jurists of the ‘sovereignty of the law’.32  
To pursue this line of enquiry, we need to discard MacCormick’s legal positivism and 
delve into the various layers of Europe’s material constitution: the formation of polity 
unity in conditions of plurality, various and competing institutions and their relative 
strengths and weaknesses, the solidity or fragility of social relations, and the various and 
conflicting political objectives pursued by the European polity and its Member States.33 A 
full account of this would involve mapping the concrete ways in which various forms of 
power are materially constituted and channeled – bolstered, transformed, restrained – 
through European law and politics.  
                                                     
29 Cf J Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights (CUP, 2013) 
30 P Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Columbia University Press, 2011) 81, he 
continues, ‘the court’s decisional authority is inseparable from its claim to speak in the voice of the sovereign 
people… not the moral authority of Hercules but the political authority of We the People’ (ibid.). 
31 See M Goldoni and M Wilkinson, ‘The Material Constitution’ (2018) Modern Law Review 567.  
32 See e.g. F Jacobs, The Sovereignty of the Law: The European Way (CUP, 2007). The new histories of legal integration 
present the early push for supremacy of European law as akin to a juridical coup d’état; see A Vauchez, ‘The 
Transnational Politics of Judicialisation: Van Gend en Loos and the Making of the EU Polity’ (2010) 16 European 
Law Journal (2010) 1; A Cohen, ‘Constitutionalism without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between 
Mobilisation and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution For Europe (1940’s-1960’s)’ (2007) 32 Law and 
Social Enquiry 109; M Rasmussen, ‘The Origins of a Legal Revolution: The Early History of the European Court 
of Justice’ (2008) 14:2 Journal of European Integration History. 
33 For an elaboration of these basic building blocks, see Goldoni and Wilkinson, above.  
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The aim here is more modest. It is to show how the folding in of political sovereignty 
into legal constitutionalism is not only a figment of the juristic imagination. On the 
contrary, it appears to capture a material transformation in the postwar European state 
and state-system, a phenomenon that provides the concrete foundations for constitutional 
pluralism to develop. I have used the label ‘authoritarian liberalism’ to identify this 
constitutional matrix, to capture both the means – legal and technocratic as opposed to 
democratic – and the ends – economic liberalism and associated phenomena such as 
marketisation and privatisation.34 A sketch here will have to suffice.   
The post-sovereign era begins with the reconstitution of Europe in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, in significant part as a reaction to the interwar breakdown of liberal 
constitutionalism, paradigmatically in West Germany. Jan-Werner Müller has documented 
in some detail the political-constitutional history of this transformation, using the label 
‘constrained democracy’ and identifying Christian Democratic politics as central to its 
constitutional dynamic.35 It is neatly encapsulated in the story of West German postwar 
constitutional development: ‘we are (afraid of) the people’.36 Reaction to the fear of 
popular sovereignty entailed a new vision not only of the governing function – in particular 
the new technocratic style – but of the governing relationship, the relation between state 
and society. It is a vision of de-democratisation both of the constituent and of the 
constituted powers, of sovereignty and of government.  
Popular sovereignty and democratic government would be constrained both through 
internal and external institutional reforms and institution-building, particularly through the 
allocation of authority to constitutional courts and other counter-majoritarian structures. 
Where these guard ‘unamendable’ constitutional provisions they would constrain even the 
derived constituent power, preventing certain forms of constitutional change and even 
erecting substantive limits (through the principle of unamendability). In the German and 
Italian cases this would lead to doctrines of counter-limits, protecting, at least on paper, a 
constitutional core from erosion by way of supranational and international agreements.37  
As a constitutional vision, the repression of sovereignty was presaged in the work of 
the German ordo-liberals, who had begun their work in the interwar period. As Carl 
Joachim Friedrich understood already in 1955, and as Foucault would later explore in his 
lectures on neo-liberal governmentality in 1979, the decisive theoretical turn triggered by 
German ordoliberalism had been to replace constituent power, qua popular sovereignty, 
with individual economic freedom — a freedom to participate in the market — as the 
legitimating device for the whole constitutional order.38 
                                                     
34 See e.g. M Wilkinson, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as 
Farce?’ (2015) European Law Journal 313.  
35 See J-W Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in 20th Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011). 
36 See C Möllers, ‘We are (Afraid of) the People: Constituent Power in German Constitutional Thought’, in Loughlin 
and Walker (eds.) The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford: OUP, 2008). The UK represents a different constitutional 
type, along with the sustained democracies of the Nordic countries.  
37 With regard to the Italian constitutional court: cf. V Barsotti, P Carozza, M Cartabia, A Simoncini, Italian 
Constitutional Justice in the Global Context (OUP, 2016) 214-217.  
38 See CJ Friedrich, ‘The Political Thought of Neo-liberalism’ (1955) American Political Science Review 49, M Foucault 
The Birth of Biopolitics — Lectures at the College de France 1978–1979 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
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For the ordo-liberals, the new economic constitutionalism, based on formal equality, 
individual economic rights and market competition, was intended to achieve the complete 
abolition of class struggle as well as national conflicts from the political domain.39 The 
class-conscious struggles of the inter-war period – emboldened by the arrival of mass 
democracy – would be repressed in order to secure political and economic stability, 
considered threatened by the democratic forces that had been unleashed with universal 
suffrage. The new civil religion for the post-war order would be fiscal prudence, efficiency 
and market rationality, the model of the German economic miracle. Democracy would be 
constrained not (only) for fear of its violating civil or political rights but out of concern 
for its impact on economic stability. The strong constitutional state would protect the 
market economy, and disarm any democratic (or capitalist) threat to it. 
The logic of economic constitutionalism is developed by the European Court of 
Justice as it turns itself into a supranational and effectively ‘constitutional court’.40 The two 
processes of domestic reconstitution and European constitutionalization are partly 
independent – dealing initially with functionally differentiated spheres – but partly 
intertwined. So, for example, domestic constitutions lay down obligations towards 
international law and European integration;41 European Union law draws on ‘common 
constitutional traditions’ of the Member States. Outside formal routes, the compound 
constitutional architecture depended on a degree of mutual deference and respect. In this 
regard, we might see the Solange saga as the highpoint of constitutional pluralism, long 
before it was labeled academically as such.42  
The post-sovereign condition also reflects a change in the social imaginary towards a 
distinct notion of the nature and limits of the democratic right to rule, including over the 
economy. It lays out a new vision of our social relations, of the person as a market 
participant (a consumer) rather than a political citizen; in the age of rights, market 
rationality would dominate over political rationality.43  
Constrained democracy is a more accurate label to capture this phenomenon than the 
inappositely named ‘militant democracy’ with which it is sometimes associated, since the 
purpose of the postwar settlement was not to promote strong vibrant publics.44 On the 
contrary it was a tamed, deracinated constitutionalism that developed. This reflects not 
only that elites are afraid of the people, but that the people are afraid of themselves, 
captured as a psychosocial phenomenon in Eric Fromm’s Escape From Freedom.45  
                                                     
39 See Bonn, Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung, Standard Texts on Social Market Economy: Two Centuries of Discussion, Horst 
Friedrich Wunsche ed. Derek Rutter trans. (Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1982) ix. This reverses the original 
meaning of the economic constitution, which had meant democratic control of the economy and emancipation of 
the working class (in the work of Neumann and Sinzheimer). See e.g. R Dukes, The Labour Constitution: The Enduring 
Idea of Labour Law (OUP, 2014). 
40 See e.g. M Maduro, We, the Court: The European Court of Justice and the Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing, 
1998).  
41 For discussion, see B De Witte, ‘‘The European Union as an International Legal Experiment’ in De Burca and 
Weiler (eds.) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP, 2012), 19 – 57. 
42 See e.g. B-O Bryde, above.  
43 See e.g. W Streek, ‘Citizens as Customers: Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption’ (2012) New Left 
Review 27  
44 See Müller, above. 
45 Authoritarianism here thus points towards a politically passive population in contrast to a highly charged, active 
movement.  
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The folding in, or repression of sovereignty that begins with postwar reconstruction 
is not therefore merely a rhetorical move advanced by jurists; it has political and social 
content.46 It reflects the identity of a society that has lost faith in its ability to exert political 
control, anchoring itself instead in the realm of self-prescribed ethical and legal principle, 
and the elite-led governance of experts.47 Juridical constitutionalism is underwritten by this 
more fundamental social change, relating to the idea and practice of collective self-
government and its limits. Politics is moderated, eventually narrowed to an extreme centre. 
This is a phenomenon that applies to the sovereign state itself, if often pursued through 
and reinforced by EU membership.48 It should be viewed neither as a purely domestic 
project transported to the EU, nor as a supranational experiment that is domesticated. It 
is a transformative development involving both simultaneously. 49   
The phenomenon of increasingly apolitical or technocratic governance has been 
captured in political economy and critical sociology as a feature of the neoliberal period of 
‘post-politics’ or ‘post-democracy’.50 This is described as a key constitutional feature of the 
neo-liberalisation of government of the past few decades, a process which has ‘de-
politicised’ or ‘de-democratised’ significant areas of policy and law-making, extended 
dramatically through the creation of Economic and Monetary Union at Maastricht. It 
tracks a similar transformation as captured here under the label post-sovereignty. But the 
term neoliberal must not occlude that the ground for this transformation is laid much 
earlier than usually implied by the term neoliberal – beginning from the start of postwar 
reconstruction – and that de-democratisation goes not only to the governing process but 
to the state and the concept of sovereignty itself.   
 
 
  
                                                     
46 This is carefully noted and outlined by N Gibbs, ‘Post-Sovereignty and the European Legal Space’ (2017) 
Modern Law Review 825.  
47 Gibbs, ibid., drawing on Marcel Gauchet.  
48 See e.g. S Hix and A Follesdal, ‘Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Reply to Majone and 
Moravscik’ (2006) Journal of Common Market Studies 533.  
49 See especially C Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States (OUP, 2012). 
50 See e.g. C Crouch, Post-Democracy (Polity Press, 2004). 
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IV. THE ROAD FROM MAASTRICHT: BEYOND THE POST-
SOVEREIGN STATE? 
 
The ideal-type of ‘post-sovereign constitutionalism’ sketched above does not resonate 
to the same extent in each domestic constitutional context. 51 But it is not merely one ideal-
type amongst others, it is also a dominant type, particularly when viewed in combination 
with a project of European integration made in its own image, as typified in the narrative 
of ‘integration-through-law’.52 This is the ground on which constitutional pluralism is 
constructed, as authority is increasingly constitutionalized, protected by counter-majoritarian 
institutions, especially constitutional courts, and pluralised, exercised by institutions at 
national and supranational level, often as features of the same quasi-federal constitutional 
architecture.  
But, contrary to MacCormick’s supposition, Maastricht did not signify the moment 
of transition towards this post-sovereign condition. That transformation in the 
constitutional imagination had already taken place. Maastricht signified, on the contrary, 
that the era of the ‘post-sovereign state’ was reaching a turning point. In other words, the 
ground that had been laid for constitutional pluralism, far from being fortified at 
Maastricht, appears increasingly unstable, as sovereignty claims begin to make their return 
after a hiatus of half a century. Political sovereignty, having been folded into legal 
constitutionalism, begins to spring back into action.53  
The return of sovereignty is often associated with the increasingly hostile rhetoric of 
the German Constitutional Court towards the project of integration and the authority of 
the ECJ.54 MacCormick himself offered a qualified defence of the German Constitutional 
Court, its Maastricht decision having ‘a sound basis in legal theory’,55 if politically 
misguided. He rejects its assertation of any ‘continuing sovereignty of the German 
people’,56 and concludes with an emphatic denial that sovereignty ‘is a continuing property 
of any Member State’ other than in the residual and formal sense that each is able to revoke 
                                                     
51 There are at least three others: the sustained democracies, the Mediterranean Enlargements, and the Post-Soviet 
accessions. It is with the deepening and widening of the Maastricht era that the broader constitutional context starts 
to matter; in these four ‘varieties of constitutionalism’ sovereignty and hence post-sovereignty resonate differently. 
Post-sovereignty in the manner described above did not reflect in the same way the sustained democracies of the 
UK and Scandinavia, nor for the Mediterranean Enlargements. And for obvious historical reasons, fears of 
democratic and state sovereignty so central to the German postwar experience, and to those countries with direct 
experience of Fascism, would not resonate in countries transitioning from the Soviet bloc: their constitutional 
consciousness was characterised by a fear not of internal democratic collapse, but of externally repressed 
sovereignty under the Soviet regime.  
52 See Vauchez, Cohen, Rassmussen, above.  
53 On the significance of sovereignty claims and sovereignty frames to the concept of sovereignty, see N Walker, 
‘Sovereignty Frames and Sovereignty Claims’ in Rawlings, Leyland, Young (eds.) Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, 
European and International Perspectives (OUP, 2013).  
54 Constitutional pluralism has an ambiguous relationship with the German Constitutional Court in general and its 
Maastricht-Urteil in particular. The significance of that judgment for generating the momentum for constitutional 
pluralist scholarship can hardly be doubted. But constitutional pluralism appears a defensive rear-guard reaction to 
its judgments, a series of attempts to domesticate them, to temper their potentially harmful effects on the European 
constitutionalist project and the post-sovereign condition.  
55 See MacCormick, note 10 above, and Questioning Sovereignty, above at 265. 
56 Ibid. 
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membership of the EU. But even that right exists only on paper, and he adds, politically, 
it is doubtful any could ‘effectively’ leave the EU ‘in present circumstances’.57  
Legally sound, politically dubious. ‘Post-sovereign’ the judgment most certainly was 
not, as the court clearly asserts the constitutional sovereignty of the German basic law and 
its own interpretative Kompetenz-Kompetenz. With its strident assertions of domestic 
constitutional sovereignty; the Member States as the ‘Masters of the Treaty’; and its 
insistence on the constitutional significance of the democratic deficit of the EU – 
prefiguring the voluminous literature on the so called ‘no demos’ thesis – the Maastricht-
Urteil already offered a serious challenge to the idea and practice of post-sovereignty that 
had developed in the postwar period.  
The full implications of the judgment would be spelled out more explicitly in the later 
Lisbon Treaty decision: sovereignty qua constitutional identity – including democratic 
discourse over ‘essential state tasks’ – is inviolable, even if the Court, again, ultimately 
accepted the constitutionality of the European Treaty.58 As Christoph Schonberger puts 
it, there is no judgment in the history of the Karlsruhe court where the conclusion – the 
constitutional permissibility of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty – is so much at odds with 
the reasoning: an emphatic assertion of national constitutional sovereignty.59  
The Lisbon ruling also gave the doctrine of restrained democracy a new twist: 
sovereignty could not be upscaled to the European Union to create a fully democratic pan-
European federal state. To do so would violate the eternally guaranteed provisions of the 
German Basic Law designed to protect democracy itself.  What had been left open at 
Maastricht – the gradual development of a European demos – was now closed. 
To be sure, the challenge to post-sovereignty represented by the Maastricht era is 
complex and uneven. The discourse of sovereignty returns, but not in the guise of a 
straightforward proclamation of the democratic constituent power or the wholesale 
rejection of the technocratic organs of governing and domestic and external constraints 
that had evolved in the postwar period. On the contrary, technocracy deepens, de-
politicisation and de-democratisation continue apace, most acutely with the plans for EMU 
in respect of the monetary authority of the Member States of the single currency. The 
unevenness and uneasiness of the discourse on sovereignty is evident from the German 
debate itself – assertive if largely unconsequential in the Maastricht ruling and evasive with 
regard to the question of constituent power in a newly reunified and sovereign country 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall.60  
Sovereignty claims start to resurface across formal and informal channels as various 
irritants. They return not predominantly via a revitalized public sphere or democratic social 
movements but via constitutionalist challenges; through constitutional identity politics; 
and most obviously perhaps, the revival of various nationalisms.61 With the space for 
                                                     
57 Questioning Sovereignty, at 265.  
58  BVerfGE, 123/267 Judgment of 30 June 2009. 
59 C Scho ̈nberger, ‘Lisbon in Karslruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal, 1201-1218. 
60 See S Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) 11 Constellations 153–
173. 
61 See J Heartfield, ‘A Process without a subject’ in Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch (eds.) Politics without 
Sovereignty (Routledge, 2006).  
                          9/2019 
 
 14 
democratic sovereignty having been largely vacated, politics hollowed out, it is identity that 
fills the gap, whether constitutional, cultural, or consumption-oriented. Constitutionalism, 
rather than ‘ruling the world’, appears to have been ruling only a ‘void’.62  
These irritants gather pace throughout the Euro-crisis, and approach a climax with a 
series of events that highlight the return of sovereignty claims: the election of Syriza in 
Greece on an anti-austerity platform, the direct challenge of the German Constitutional 
Court to a programme of the European Central Bank credited with saving the Euro, a 
migrant crisis which sees the collapse of the Schengen and Dublin regimes, the triggering 
of Article 50 for the first time as a Member State prepares to leave the EU, and a rule of 
law crisis in respect of countries violating the foundational values of the EU. 63 
The crisis of post-sovereignty is complex due to the fact that there are now different 
sets of sovereign claims exerting pressure on the current system. Sovereignty claims re-
emerge both ‘from below’ – in regard to the so-called ‘populist’ surge in the nation-state, 
in the core of Europe as well as in the periphery – and ‘from above’, in regard to a 
European Union that is increasingly exercising emergency politics of its own. The 
centrifugal force of resurgent nationalisms is thus matched by the centripetal force of a 
‘sovereignty-to-come’, exerted through formal institutions such as the European Central 
Bank (in turn bolstered by European Court of Justice), ‘formally informal institutions’ such 
as the Euro-group, and informal efforts at consolidating the EU’s authority such as 
Juncker’s 2018 ‘State of the Union address’, dramatically entitled ‘the hour of European 
sovereignty’.  
But the sovereign claims of Member States on the one hand and the ECJ, the ECB 
and the Commission on the other, represent a picture of highly distorted notions of 
sovereignty, based on a mix of nationalism, technocratic authority and German 
mercantilist interests.64 Some states are clearly more post-sovereign than others.65 Without 
a genuine sense of member state equality, the federation is liable to shade into a hegemonic 
entity, dominated by a single state, or a bloc of states, and even to evoke imperialism in its 
political form. 
  
                                                     
62 See P Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing Out of Western Democracy (Verso, 2013).  
63 See M Wilkinson, ‘Constitutional Pluralism: Chronicle of a Death Foretold?’ (2017) European Law Journal (2017) 
213. 
64 See eg C Lapavitsas and H Flassbeck, Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone (Verso, 2015). 
65 See M Wilkinson, ‘The Euro is Irreversible! Or is it? On OMT, Austerity and the Threat of “Grexit”’ (2015) 
German Law Journal 1049.  
  
Wilkinson       Beyond the Post-Sovereign State? 
 
 15 
V.  DEMOCRACY, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM’S MISSING MATERIAL 
 
As Jürgen Habermas had argued after the Maastricht-Urteil, the democratic deficit of 
the EU was already ‘expanding day by day because the economic and social dynamics even 
within the existing institutional framework perpetuate the erosion of national powers 
through European law’.66 After Maastricht, questions of the compatibility of European 
Union with political sovereignty and democracy begin to take political centre stage in a 
way that they had not previously. 
These democratic and political-economic aspects of constitutional transformation 
were almost entirely missed by MacCormick. In Questioning Sovereignty, despite its focus on 
the European Union, one looks in vain for any discussion of the impact of market 
integration on social values, or the likely impact of the single currency on macroeconomic 
policy choices. 67  So, for example, although he integrates ‘neoliberal market subsidiarity’ 
into his complex and abstract constitutional formula for the ‘European commonwealth’, 
he entirely evades the concrete effects of market integration as it has in practice shaped 
the political economy of the EU, including in large part as a result of decisions of the 
European Court of Justice.68  
Questions of political economy in general and economic constitutionalism in 
particular hardly feature at all in MacCormick’s analysis and it is worth pausing briefly to 
consider why. It is not because the discussion remains ‘pure’ in a Kelsenian sense. The key 
non-legal phenomenon around which the legal discussion of sovereignty and post-
sovereignty is constructed is nationalism.69 MacCormick’s more specific goal is to defend 
nationalism, at least a moderate civic variety, a ‘liberal nationalism’, whilst attacking the 
notion of sovereignty as both outdated and undesirable. But where does nationalism 
without sovereignty leave democracy, other than as a vague cultural connection, or 
indeterminate appeal to subsidiarity?  
MacCormick explicitly defended a ‘mixed constitution’ or ‘mixed commonwealth’ 
rather than a democratic constitution.70 This is also how he saw the European Union 
developing. The concrete weakness of the position lies in the implicit assumption that 
social democracy could be protected through such a ‘mixed constitution’, where the 
elements held in balance are ‘oligo-bureaucratic’ and only ‘indirectly democratic’.71 In these 
passages he briefly alludes to the – already apparent – democratic deficit of the EU but 
clearly wants to minimize it as a political and constitutional issue.  
                                                     
66 J Habermas, ‘Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution’’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 
303. 
67 MacCormick’s declared political goal was to pursue a soft version of social democracy. He firmly rejected any 
‘purely market-economical view of the good society’ (Questioning Sovereignty, 174-5). As a matter of political 
philosophy, he explicitly attacked voluntaristic liberalism of the social contract variety in favour of contextual 
individualism associated with the communitarian tradition (e.g. ibid. at 162-3). 
68 Questioning Sovereignty, 152. Elusively, and all too briefly, he skirts over ‘whatever storm clouds now hover over 
the prospects for the single currency’, 155. MacCormick was far from the only one to succumb to what Majone 
later characterized as the ‘culture of total optimism’.  
69 See chapter 11 of Questioning Sovereignty.  
70 Ibid. 145 – 149. 
71 Ibid., at 149. 
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This neglect is underwitten by MacCormick’s point of departure. The Austinian 
framework of sovereignty as political command elides sovereignty as a symbol of collective 
self-determination, of the relative autonomy of the political in a secular and democratic 
state. Modern democratic sovereignty assumes the autonomy of the political vis-à-vis both 
the church and the market as it were. To move beyond sovereignty is not, or not merely, 
to leave command theory behind; it is to risk surrendering democracy to new theologies 
or market rationality.  
Constitutional pluralists show little recognition of this, even once neo-liberalism and 
ordo-liberalism have become a significant part of the academic vernacular and critical 
theorizing has become more mainstreamed into EU studies.72 How varieties of social 
democracy, or ‘varieties of capitalism’, can withstand the dynamic of market integration is 
a question they rarely posed, although clearly central to any concern for protecting 
constitutional plurality.  
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 began to reveal cracks in the 
legitimacy of the project of integration that in reality had begun to open up since 
Maastricht. The cracks became more serious after Viking and Laval, once it was more 
widely observed that because of the logic of the single market in combination with the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect of EU law, European constitutionalism in 
practice was operating in favour of free movement of the factors of production and to the 
detriment of fundamental rights, especially social rights and welfare entitlements.73  
Constitutional pluralists could have objected to these developments, on the grounds 
that prioritising economic freedoms in EU law was in danger of eroding values and 
concrete relationships protected within the domestic constitutional order. The two 
systems (domestic and European) may have been ‘equally valid’ in theory, but this did not 
reflect the practical impact of their collision and coexistence. The legitimate concern would 
have been that the primacy of EU law in conjunction with an expansive interpretation of 
free movement would potentially negate any parity of norms between domestic and 
European constitutions, eroding the heterogeneity in political economy. But constitutional 
pluralists tended to avoid the material flashpoints, seeking reconciliation rather than 
rebellion. To link the discussion back to MacCormick’s earlier emphasis on social 
democracy, due to the trajectory of integration and its political-economic asymmetries 
structured through the constitutionalising of free movement, even retaining an equilibrium 
between democracy and capitalism would in practice have required strong defence of the 
domestic welfare state and domestic democratic autonomy.74 Fritz Scharpf saw this clearly 
and explained the structural reasons for the neoliberal bias in the EU’s economic 
constitution in painstaking detail.75  
Constitutional pluralists were not card-carrying neoliberals, although, to be sure, few 
neoliberals carry their membership card openly. But their neglect of the material 
                                                     
72 See especially F Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration: or Why Europe Can’t Have a Social Market 
Economy’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 211 – 250. 
73 See e.g. M Lasser, ‘Fundamentally Flawed’ (2014) 15 Theoretical Inquiries into Law 229. 
74 See e.g. W Streeck, Buying Time: Reflections on the Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso, 2014).  
75 See e.g. Scharpf, above. In fact, as Scharpf explains, it was already grasped by Hayek in the 1930’s in his work 
on interstate federation.  
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consequences of integration along with a certain European constitutional optimism and 
anti-statist bias obscured the path being taken. The cases of Viking and Laval, although 
indicative of the neoliberal trajectory of integration, would pale in comparison to the scale 
and extent of the demands of structural adjustment that would be made within the Euro-
regime on debtor states. But it is important to note that, materially, the Euro-crisis 
response represents a deepening rather than departure from the economically liberal path 
of integration that had accompanied the post-sovereign condition: marketisation, 
privatisation and liberalisation are accelerated, if under the auspices of an austerity regime 
accompanied by the rhetoric of exceptional politics and economic emergency.  
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The states of Europe are one set of entities, the European Union another, announced 
MacCormick in ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’.76 The notion that the states of Europe are 
‘one set’ of entities may be trivially true in so far as each of them are (not-fully-sovereign) 
states. But in its generality it obscures what is significant about their constitutional 
authority, not only their diverse constitutional histories, and their diverse relationships 
with the EU and the project of integration, but their varying power and authority within 
and across the EU. This not only reflects informal hierarchy between debtor and creditor 
states and between surplus and deficit countries, it also now has a material impact through 
formal institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European Central 
Bank. 
This raises a concluding point, which is that plurality itself was strangely absent from 
the constitutional pluralist literature. In focusing its analytical and normative energies 
almost entirely on the relationship between the domestic and European constitutional 
orders – mirrored in the anti-pluralism that now seeks to bury it – constitutional pluralism 
neglected a crucial relationship: the horizontal relations among Member States. 
A significance part of the purpose of the project of European integration was always 
to promote restrained sovereignty not vis-à-vis a notional supranational entity, but vis-à-
vis other states. Supranationalism was the means towards the end of balancing the powers 
of Europe, not an end in itself.  This goal was initially geared towards West Germany – 
raising the so-called ‘German question’ – a country whose status was anyway provisional 
in the post-war era due to the divisions of the Cold War. The German question would 
return in the Maastricht era, and has increased in significance since the Euro-crisis as 
hegemony is back on the agenda.77   
Ironically, therefore, the anti-pluralists may have revealed an uncomfortable but 
significant truth. Given where the EU now is and where it is going, the only way to 
maintain constitutional plurality may be outside the EU as currently configured. Far from 
moving beyond the sovereign state, or into a post-Westphalian era, it is through 
                                                     
76 Note 1, above. 
77 Cf. U Beck, A German Europe (Polity, 2013). 
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democratic sovereignty and democratic social and political movements that constitutional 
plurality might be resurrected. This may now depend on the possibility of rupture with the 
existing order; it would also require a certain level of international solidarity to work in 
practice, if not degenerating into an anarcho-style regional competitive disorder. But 
solidarity is currently substituted in the EU by a number of logics that remain in a fragile 
condition, fomenting increasing disequilibrium albeit without rupture: German hegemony, 
peripheral weakness of will and lack of alternatives to the current European economic 
project. None of these on its own perhaps is conclusive, but in conjunction they may signal 
the end of constitutional plurality.  
It would be tempting now to repeat MacCormick’s error and confidently proclaim 
that we are, already, beyond the post-sovereign state. The current situation however is too fluid, 
it is too early to tell where things will lead. That the accelerated return of sovereignty claims 
presents severe challenges to the continued relevance of the post-sovereign condition so 
central to constitutional pluralism seems undeniable. But whereas in the postwar 
settlement constitutional plurality was served by the repression of sovereignty, in the 
present conjuncture, plurality appears to require a renewal of democratic sovereignty. It 
requires the harnessing of precisely that which constitutional pluralism professed to have 
superseded. Moving beyond the post-sovereign state may now be the only way for 
constitutional pluralism to survive. Brexit then might appear as an overdue reawakening 
of the sleeping sovereign, and even an opportunity to reconnect sovereignty with ultimate 
democratic authority.78 
 
                                                     
78 On the image of the sleeping sovereign see R Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy (CUP, 
2016). 
